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FAIRNESS TO THE JUVENILE OFFENDER
MON.D G. PAULSEN*

The procedure used in juvenile courts is the target of a steady
fire of criticism particularly with respect to juvenile delinquency
cases. "We Need Not Deny Justice to Our Children" is the title of a
recent article m the Civil Liberties Record,' published by the
'Greater Philadelphia Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union.
A California judge has written that the juvenile court "is fast
developing into a complete system of fascism, as dangerous to our
institutions as commumsm." 2 A writer discussing the Georgia
Juvenile Court Act has said. "The flowery platitudes of this
act cannot close the gateway to tyranny which it has opened."5
It is surprismg to find such intemperate expression employed
with respect to legislation designed for humanitarian purposes. Men
of good will created juvenile courts for the benefit and protection of
children in the light of the appalling consequences visited upon
*Professor of Law, Columbia University. The basic research for this
paper was done m the summer of 1955 when the author held a smnmer research appointment at the Umversity of Minnesota.
1. Civil Liberties Record of the Greater Philadelphia Branch ACLU,
Feb. 1956. The tenor of another article is also suggested by its title, Ellrod
and Melany, Juvenile Justice: Treatment or Travesty? 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
277 (1950). '"Philadelphia ACLU Aids Court Rights of Juveniles" is the
headline over a two column article on page 3 of the monthly paper, Civil
Liberties in New York, Oct. 1956, published by the New York Civil Liberties
Uion. The article is written by Spencer Coxe, Executive Director of the
ACLU's Greater Philadelphia Branch.
2. Olney, Juvenile Courts-Abolish Them, 13 Cal. State B. J. 1, 2
(April-May 1938). In a like vetn: "[I]t has become settled law in this
country that the constitutional guarantees applicable to crmninal procedure
accorded to known criminals, acknowledged Communists, and enemy aliens
before our courts, need not be considered in the sentencing to reformatories
of our young citizens adjudged to be juvenile delinquents." Note, Due Process
in the Juvenile Courts,2 Catholic U. L. Rev. 90, 91 (1952) ; "It is unfortunate
that the mechanics of that system are so ridden with danger to the persons
who are to be the object of that protection." 49 Geo. L. J. 138, 141 (1955).
See also the dissent in In re Holmes, 279 Pa. 599, 610-30, 109 A2d 523, 528-37
(1954).
Some of the criticism is more temperate. "In the search for proner
judicial standards to govern juvenile court proceedings there remains a vital
balance of interests yet to be struck between an informal approach emphasizing reformation and rehabilitation, on the one hand, and a more formal
procedure designed to guard against punishment of the innocent, on the
other." 41 Corn. L. Q. 147, 154 (1955). See also Note, Riqhts of Juveniles
to ConstitutionalGuarantees in Delinquency Proceedings,27 Colum. L. Rev.
968 (1927). Rubin, Protecting the Child in the Juvenile Court, 43 J. Crim.
L. and Crim. 425 (1952), is a constructive piece by one close to the juvenile
court movement.

Miller, Responsibility-In Criminal Law and in Treating Juvenile
Offenders, 23 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 267 (1955), makes the criticism that
juveniles should be held to a stricter responsibility for their choices.
3. O'Neil, Crimnal Law, 3 Mercer L. Rev. 46, 59 (1951).
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youngsters by the criminal law. Under the system of an earlier day,
a child of eight or nine could be marred for life by conviction of
crime and subsequent imprisonment with hardened criminals. Execution of the very young was not unknown to the stern criminal
law practices of the eighteenth century 4 Reform was accomplished
by replacing notions of punishment with concepts of care and rehabilitation.'
According to the philosophy of the Juvenile Court Acts, a child
is not to be accused, but to be offered assistance and training by the
state if there is some demonstrated need for it. The adjudication
that state intervention in a child's life is necessary is not supposed
to carry the stigma of criminal guilt." Records are not generally
available for inspection. 7 Probationary supervision, not continued
detention, is sufficient treatment in all but the most serious cases. In
those relatively few instances which require institutionalization the
child is supposed to be housed in such a way as to give him the
rehabilitation and training he needs. The aim throughout is individualized treatment according to the needs of the youth, not
punishment according to the seriousness of the act, redemption not
retaliation." The care offered the child, in the words of the first
Juvenile Court Act, "shall approximate as nearly as may be that
which should be given by its parents."
4.

We can still be quite harsh today. State v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 170, 60

N.W.2d 105 (1953), tells of the second degree murder conviction of a boy
fourteen and one-half years old at the time of the event. State v. Gum, 212 La.
475, 32 So2d 895 (1947), affirms the murder conviction of sixteen year old
defendant. In 1945 a Kentucky trial court convicted an eleven year old boy of
raping a five year old girl and sentenced him to 2 years in the state reformatory. The conviction was reversed for error in the instruction. Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 480, 189 S.W.2d 686 (1945).
5. The most widely consulted statement of the basic aims of the court
is Mack, The Juvenile Court,23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909).
6.

For example, a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency cannot be

used as the basis for impeaching his credibility as a defendant-witness in a
criminal case. Woodley v. State, 227 Ind. 407, 86 N.E2d 529 (1949) State v.
Coffman, 360 Mo. 782, 230 S.W.2d 761 (1950). Compare the dissenting
opinion of Judge Stevens in Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C.
Cir. 1941). It has been held that fingerprints and photographs taken of delinquents must be returned by the police. Campbell v. Adams, 206 Misc. 673.
133 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (1954).
7 Sussman, Juvenile Delinquency 31 (1950). Statements made in
juvenile court may not be used in other proceedings according to the )uvenile
court acts. In an interesting Colorado case Judge Lindsey was ordered to
testify as to what a child had told him before the juvenile court proceedings
had formally begun by petition. The Judge argued that the proceedings had
already begun in the "breast" of the judge as the child began to speak.
Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 Pac. 531 (1919).
8. A good text treatment of the philosophy of the juvenile court is
found in Bloch & Flynn, Delinquency, The Juvenile Offender in America
Today 305-37 (1956).
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The procedure in a juvenile case is much more informal than
that m a crinmal prosecution. Even though the court may take
a child's liberty until his majority, all the protections of an accused
are not extended to him. The courts have reasoned that juvenile
proceedings are civil andnot criminal in character, hence the specific
criminal safeguards are not applicable." The Juvenile Court Acts
have been upheld on the theory that the state is merely acting as
parens patriae for the youngster's protection in the way as it does
in a guardianship matter and not accusing the child with a view
to punishment as it does in a prosecution for crme.10
The beneficent purpose of the protective legislation led some
to opimons as extravagant in their own way as the contrary views
quoted in the opening paragraph. Thus, a 1904 case upholding the
right of an official to commit a fifteen year old to a girls' reform
school merely upon her parents' application, characterized the restraint as an opportunity for "moral and physical well being."' The
court went on to say, "The child herself, having no right to control
her own action or to select her own course of life, had no legal
right to be heard in these proceedings. Hence, the law which does
not reqmre her to be brought in person before the committing
officer or extend her the privilege of a hearing on her own behalf
cannot be said to deprive her of the benefit of due process of law. "1
And again from an early Pennsylvania case upholding the constitu9. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 At. 678 (1923), is a key opinion.

All of the important prior cases on the basic constitutional issues are cited
there and all of the important issues were raised in that case.
10. Among the leading cases are Ex parte Januszewskl, 196 Fed. 123
(S.D. Ohio 1911), United States ex reL. Yomck v. Briggs, 266 Fed. 434
(W.D. Pa. 1920) ; Ex Porte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W 465 (1919), Cinque
v. Boyd, supra note 9; Taylor v. Means, 139 Ga. 578, 77 S.E. 373 (1913). Inre
Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908), Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328.
100 N.E. 892 (1913), Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 299 N.W 205
(1930), In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915), Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W 1137 (1911), Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass.
203, 6 N.E. 830 (1886), Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315,
115 N.W 682 (1908), In re Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 187
N.W 226 (1922) ; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928),
State v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359 254 S.W 179 (1923), State v. Burnett, 179
N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711 (19205, Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62
AtL 198 (1905), Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W 643 (1915),
Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907), In re Johnson, 173 Wis.
571, 181 N.W 741 (1921).
11. Rule v. Geddes, 23 Asp. D.C. 31 (1904). State v. Worden, 162 Oiuo
St 593, 124 N.E.2d 817 (1955), held the following old Oluo statute repealed
by implication from the Juvenile Court Act: "If a crime is charged against
a youth before a Grand Jury and the charge is supported by sufficient evidence to put him on trial, such youth may be committed by the Court to the
Boys' Industrial School on the recommendation of the Grand Jury without
presenting an indictment."
12. Rule v. Geddes, mtpra note 11 at 50.
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tionality of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act, "[H]e could not
have been without due process of law, for the constitutional guaranty
is that no one charged with a criminal offense shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law
[T]he state
[is not] required to adopt any process as a means of placing its
hands upon the child to lead it into one of its courts."'1 "There is
no probability, in the proper administration of the law, of the child's
liberty being unduly invaded.'

14

These optimistic points of view come to trouble on at least
three counts (1) any restraint by the state, even one springing
from the kindest of motives, is a restraint which must have some
justification, (2) children are, in fact, sometimes treated arbitrarily, (3) the institutions to which children are sent, however
lofty in purpose, are often little better than prisons for the young.
This article is an attempt to discover what courts can do to
protect the rights of the child more adequately without sacrificing
the very real benefits of our courts for children. Clearly a child is
entitled to due process of law whether the juvenile court administers
civil or criminal justice. Whether a boy or girl should be afforded
a protection given an accused adult is not necessarily determined by
taking note of the fact that the judge is presiding over a civil trial.
Nor can we jump to the conclusion (even as to that portion of the
juvenile court's proceedings designed to adjudicate the fact of
delinquency) that we should "grant the child all the safeguards of
due process that protect the rights of an accused adult before his
liberty can be taken away 15 Fairness is a relative standard. The
proper inquiry is what does fairness require in a children's court
case? What follows is an examination of many topics with this
question in mind. All of the topics will require more extended consideration. The author's often too dogmatically stated conclusions
are intended only to bring us to the threshold of discussion.
One other point requires underscoring at the beginning. There
is a relationship between the rights of a child and the treatment
given him by the juvenile court. If the result of an adjudication of
delinquency is substantially the same as a verdict of guilty, the
youngster has been cheated of his constitutional rights by false
labeling. We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by
changing names from "criminal prosecution" to "delinquency proceedings." The propriety of a change in procedure turns upon a
13. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 Atl. 198, 200 (1905)
14. Id. at 56, 62 Atl. at 201.
15. Civil Liberties Record of the Greater Philadelphia Branch ACLU,
Feb. 1956.
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change in theory and the substantial realization of the theory in
practice.
FAIR TREATMENT BREFoRE TRIAL

Standards of fair treatment of any alleged law violator ought to
be applied before the time of trial. The child who may be delinquent
ought to be handled by the police with even more circumspection and
understanding than the adult accused of crime. Lifelong attitude towards law enforcement and the police are formed in these first contacts with law enforcement officials. Police are m need of special
instruction respecting the handling of children's cases so that the
process of rehabilitation can begin at the earliest possible time. 10
The protection of children requires that police have broader
powers to take juveniles into custody than to arrest adults. A policeman should be able to detain a child if he has reasonable grounds to
believe that the child is delinquent. This proposal would extend a
policeman's authority beyond the provisions of the Standard Juvenile- Court Act which provides "any child found violating any law
or ordinance, or whose surroundings are such as to endanger his
welfare" 17 may be taken into custody. If a policeman without a warrant is powerless unless he finds the child violating a law, the restriction is unrealistic."' He may possess information short of personal knowledge of a law violation (indeed the knowledge may be an
act not illegal according to the criminal law at all) which strongly
supports a belief that a child is delinquent. In such cases, for the
benefit of the child, an officer should be able to act. If the youngster,
after being taken into custody, is treated in accordance with the
provisions of the Juvenile Court Acts, his rights are adequately
protected.
Juvenile court statutes typically provide that parents are to be
informed as soon as children are arrested, and the youngsters are
to be released to the custody of their parents if that is at all feasible.' 0
16. U. S..Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau,
Police Services for juveniles (1954), Kenney & Pursuit, Police Work with
Juveniles (1954).
17 The quoted language is from Art. IV, § 15, of the Standard
Juvenile Court Act published by the Nat'l Probation & Parole Ass'n (1949).
The Standard Act (and many others) state that taking a child into custody
shall not be termed an arrest. Whatever value may come from the change of
label, it should not operate to shield the exercise of force, inevitably involved,
from the necessity of some justification in fact.
18. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Children's Bureau,
Standards for Specialized Courts 36-37 (1954). See Application of Jones,
206 Misc. 557, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1954) (order of detention founded solely
on allegations made upon information and belief).
19. Sussman, Juvenile Delinquency 39 (1950). See also Art. IV, § 15, of
the Standard juvenile Court Act cited note 17 supra.
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Obviously, bail ought not be a matter of right in a juvenile case,
not because the proceedings are civil rather than criminal in character but, more importantly, because a child in trouble may need
care immediately and that care is not provided by a simple release
from custody 20 Discharge to parents will not be wise in every
case because the parents may be the source of a child's difficulty 21
Of course, some review of the decision to keep a child in detention
pending a juvenile court adjudication ought to be available in the
courts. The writ of habeas corpus can accomplish the release of a
boy or girl arbitrarily kept in custody before adjudication."
Temporary detention in the regular jail is deplorable, but in
many parts of the country no other facilities are available.2 In this,
as in so many other respects, the fair treatment of the juvenile is
not simply a matter of restricting public officials, but of affirmatively
providing adequate facilities.
The flippancy and impertinence of some young. people can be
an irritant to policemen from whom the greatest forebearance is
4
required. Myers v. Collett,2
from Utah, is a striking example of
how badly a children's case can be handled. Three boys were questioned by police officers who were investigating a "prowler complaint." The youngsters became impertinent and evasive whereupon
they were arrested for "violation of curfew and investigation of
activities." They were taken to a detention home from which they
were not released until the next day After the arrest an officer
called one of the parents who asked if the boys might be released
were he to drive to the station and bring them home. The officer
20. Louisiana has held that a juvenile has a right to bail pending a
determination of delinquency. State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211
(1943). However, an appeal does not operate to suspend a judgment of commitment in Louisiana juvenile cases. State v. McDonald, 206 La. 732, 20 So.2d 6
(1944). The cases are discussed in Jackson, The Right to Bail anl Suspensive Appeal in the LouisianaJuvenile Courts, 20 Tul. L. Rev. 363 (1946).
Because of the speed with which the juvenile courts normally operate,
the right to be free on bail is much more important after the adjudication
pending an appeal than before. Admission to bail, as a matter of right in
such circumstances has been denied. In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73,
242 P.2d 362 (1952), State v. Fullmer, 76 Ohio App. 335, 62 N.E.2d 268
(1945), Ex parte Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W 576 (1945).
21. See, for example, In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So.2d 466 (1954)
which tells of a young girl who had sexual relations with a man in "her
mother's bed at her home in New Orleans, with her mother's apparent consent and approval," and Application of Jones, 206 Misc. 557, 134 N.Y.S.
2d 90 (1954), which tells of a fifteen year old who had been abused by her
stepfather.
22. Application of Jacobsen, 278 App. Div. 945, 104 N.Y.S. 2 d 949
(1951).
23. See Carr, Most Courts Have to be Substandard, 13 Federal Probation 29 (Sept. 1949).
24. 1 Utah 2d 406, 268 P.2d 432 (1954)
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replied that they would have to wait until morning. Apparently the
policeman's attitude was the result of antagonism aroused by the
conduct of one of the youngsters. Under the Utah statute the officer,
"unless it is impracticable," must release a child to his parents.
When one of the boys sued for false imprisonment, he was denied
recovery on the grounds that the policeman had no duty to notify
parents of the child's right to release, and that the plaintiff's parent
had not been the one who had inquired about the possibility of
taking the boys home. Perhaps the decision can be defended on
narrow technical grounds. Yet the conduct of the officers, motivated by a spirit of vengeance, can only be deplored. It is difficult
to think that these boys have an increased respect for law enforcement after their first brush with the police and that their parents
will not reinforce any hostile feelings which the boys may have.
The aim of the plaintiff in Collett is sound. Civil liability ought
to be imposed on the police for violation of statutory provisions concerning the handling of a juvenile between the time of arrest and
trial.2 5 The deterrent effect of such suits should be increased by
provisions for statutory mima in respect to damages. Recognizing
liability here would not impair the efficiency of the police by making them hesitant to act when quick action is wanted-a point
sometimes made against proposals for more adequate civil recovery
in false arrest and illegal search cases. The officer can protect
himself by simply following the direction of the statute.
In the ordinary administration of the criminal law, every case
of a known violation of law is not brought to trial. A vast discretionary power is lodged in the prosecutor. The power is almost
without check save for an appeal to the ballot box, but almost everyone agrees that it is a necessary power. The same need exists to
pick and choose the juvenile cases appropriate for official action. A
great many juvenile cases are disposed of informally. In practice
this means that discretion is lodged in a policeman or a caseworker
in the intake service of a juvenile court, either (1) to institute proceedings in the court, (2) to merely give a warning, (3) to offer
advice, (4) to dismiss a satisfactory conference adjusting matters
between the complainant and the child or his family, (5) or to refer
the case to a social agency. 26 Sometimes informal adjustments can
give rise to great abuses. It should be remembered that without the
25. Lotusville & N.R. Co. v. Offutt, 204 Ky. 51, 263 S.W 665 (1924),
permitted a recovery of $500 damages by a twelve year old arrested by railroad police who failed to take him to the juvenile authorities.

26. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau,
Standards for Specialized Courts 37-38 (1954).
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filing of a petition the juvenile court is without power to act. Informal action taken by the police or members of the court's staff
without an adjudication by the court can be a kind of informal and
linofficial probation which interferes very much with the life of the
child and for which there is no sanction save the fear of being
brought to court.27 In principle, however difficult the principle may
be to apply, no coercive measures should be taken without a formal
court decision reached after a hearing. The practical enforcement
of this principle probably depends upon controls other than litigation
before the juvenile court or elsewhere. Juvenile courts should become sufficiently sensitive to the rights of children and parents to
restrain their staffs from the use of state power without a reason
demonstrated to others.
As we have said, what is fair to a youngster in the juvenile court
depends, in part, upon how far the philosophy of that court is
realized in fact. A youth's rights are not those of a person accused
of crime because he is to be protected from the stigma of crime. The
state does not accuse him but proceeds in his interest. How short performance can fall is shown by Hams v. Souder,2 a 1954 case from
Indiana, in which the form of the proceeding given Harris was
nearly identical with that given to an accused. The record of the
case before the Johnson Circuit Court was entered in "Criminal
Order Book Number 4," and the cause was styled "State of Indiana
v. Axel Harris." The record tells that Harris was "duly arraigned"
and "for his plea says
guilty
as charged." The order of the
court adjudged him "guilty as charged." Even the Supreme Court
of Indiana, in discussing the case referred to "the charge is then for
a juvenile offense, to-wit delinquency "9 If part of the aim of the
juvenile court is to free a child from the coloration of crime and
from the damning impact of criminality by removing some of its
symbols, Indiana has failed miserably To the extent of the failure,
a child has lost some of his legal protection without gaining what
was to be given in return.
27 The dangers oi informal but directive handling of juvenile cases
is described in Tappen, Unoflicial Delinquency, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 547 (1950)
Professor Tappen asserts that the trend toward the imposition of controls
without court adjudication stems from a recognition of the harm which comes
to a child from an adjudication of delinquency and of the injustice of
attributing the status to youngsters who have done no real injury to the
community, but because of the embrasive definitions of the statutes are
brought within the power of the court.

28. 233 Ind. 287, 119 N.E.2d 8 (1954)
29. Id. at 293, 119 N.E.2d at 11. A boy, charged with being delinquent

in that he committed burglary and larceny, was found a "delinquent and
guilty as charged." Relief from the form of the adjudication was denied on
the ground that the juvenile was not prejudiced thereby. State v. Harold, 281
S.W.2d 605 (Mo. App. 1955)
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DEFINING THE ISSUE BY LW

A juvenile court judge may not make disposition of a child just
because it seems like a good thing to do. The trial judge in In rc
Coyle3" defended his adjudication by saying that "the court was
simply making a determination as to whether or not the
appellant's future training, and the best interests of the State would
be best served by taking him from his home and placing him where
proper training was available." 31-The appellate court did not agree.
"Juvenile court procedure has not been so far socialized and individual rights so far diminished that a child may be taken from its
parents and placed m a state institution simply because some court
might think that to be m the best interests of the state.
Some
specific act or conduct must be charged as constituting the delinquency and the truth of such charge must be determined in an
32
adversary proceeding."
The reasons for which a court may interfere in the life of a
child are set forth in the juvenile court act of each state.33 The reasons with which this article is principally concerned have to do with
the misconduct of the child and embrace a great range of behavior.
However, under the most frequently used provisions of juvenile
court acts, a child comes within the power of the court if he
violates any state law, federal law or municipal ordinance, if he is
acting beyond the control of his parents, or if he is associating with
persons probably leading him to a life of crime.
It can be seen that the statutes are very far ranging indeed. By
these definitions, almost every child could be adjudicated a delinquent.3 What youngster grows up without violating a federal
or state law, or a municipal ordinance? What child ha not stolen
30. 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E2d 192 (1951).
31. Id. at 219, 101 N.E.2d at 193.
32.
33.

Id. at 219-20, 101 N.E.2d at 193.
The provisions of the many state statutes are tabulated in Sussman,

Juvenile Delinquency 20-21 (1950).
34. Appellate courts have sometimes reversed a finding of delinquency if
based only on narrow technical grounds. Although the language quoted
below states only one of several reasons for reversal in a Virguua opinion,
it is of great interest ohi this point:
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the accused were
inherently vicious or incorrigible. To classify an infant as delinquent
because of a youthful prank, or for a mere single violation of a misdemeanor statute or a municipal ordinance, not immoral per se, in this day
of numberless laws and ordinances is offensive to our sense of justice and
to the intendment of the law. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the
thought that the incautious violation of a motor velucle traffic law, a
single act of truancy or a departure of an established rule of similar
slight gravity, is sufficient to justify the classification of the offender
as a "delinquent," and require the supervision of a probation officer. We
can but reflect that if this were so, there would be an inclusion of so

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:547

an apple or filched a penny or played a harmful Halloween prank?
Yet the youngster is probably not more completely blanketed by
the delinquency law than an adult by the criminal law. To some
extent we are all law violators. Adults must rely on the good sense
of law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges. The prosecutor
does not normally play the same sifting role in children's cases as
he does in those concerning adults, so the young must depend
upon good sense of intake services, and on the discretion of juvenile
judges themselves, for protection from the tyranny of "over enforcement" of the law 35
Some of the statutory language in juvenile court acts would be
unconstitutionally vague if it were used as the basis for criminal
prosecution. 6 What does it mean to be "incorrigible," to "grow up
in idleness or crime," to "so deport himself as to injure or endanger
self or others," or "to engage in immoral or indecent conduct?"
Without defending the specific formulations above against constitutional attack even in a juvenile case, we must admit that some
juvenile cases do call for a standard rather than a single, specific
law violation to measure the appropriateness of court intervention.
There must be some way to deal with a boy of sixteen who spends
a lot of his time visiting a home that has been turned into a school
many m the classification that the word would lose its accepted meaning.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343, 38 S E.2d 444 447-48 (1946). See
also State v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1992) (a single act of
assault with intent to commit rape does not establish delinquency under the
Iowa law). In Iowa a child is a delinquent only if he "habitually" violates
the law. Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928), holds that a
single act of taking an automobile is neither "incorrigibility" nor "growing
up in idleness or crime."
A Note, Misapplicationof the Parens PatriaePower, 29 Ind. L. J. 475
(1954), argues that the employment of the parens patriae doctrine requires
that a finding of parental unfitness be made before a delinquent can be committed to a public institution. The contention has been made and rejected
in a Texas case, Dudley v. State, 219 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) See
also State v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951). The California
Welfare and Institutions Code § 739 (Supp. 1956), requires in some circumstances an express finding that the child's welfare demands that custody be
taken from parents or that the parents are unfit to train and educate the
child. In re Barajas, 114 Cal. App. 2d 22, 249 P.2d 350 (1952), reverses a
trial court for failure to make the finding.
In re Jacobson, 283 App. Div. 719, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 356 (1954) is an
example of a delinquency adjudication founded on a not-very-serious violation
of the law. The boy, sixteen, was driving an auto without a license. Without
more evidence, it is not clear that the boy needed "treatment" to improve
his character.
35. "It is indeed a definite indication of a highly unsocial legal order
when our most gifted and astute observers suggest a 'selective law-breaking'
as the only path to the liberty that free men must have." Harper, The Forces
Behind and Beyond Juristic Pragmatism in America, printed in II Recucil
d'Etudes sur Les Sources Du Droit en L'Honneur de Frangois G~ny 261

(1932).

36. Cf. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939)
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for sexual delinquency even though he himself did not participate.3 7
If the treatment process is, in fact, rehabilitative and redemptive,
it oukht-to be applied to cases in which the youngster's commission
of-an:actual criminal act is just a matter of time. Fundamentally,
any- standard employed should suggest an inquiry into parental
supervision and control.2 5 If that control is permitting criminality
-to develop or is seriously defective in other ways, the rest of us
-must :take a hand. Unhappily, the standard cannot state with precision the circumstances under which the courts will act. Neverthelessi the only alternative would be to refrain from action winch
might salvage an obviously deteriorating life.
THE PETITION INITIATING PROCEEDINGS

The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is begun by a petition
which must be written and must set forth the facts which brings the
child within the power of the court." The petition is a much less
'formal document than a criminal indictment or information, and
need only stand the test whether the child is adequately informed
of the reasons for his being in court. In most courts, inexpertly
drawn petitions are sufficient if the youngster is not prejudiced
thereby. 0 The petition may allege several law violations, even
though such a pleading might be subject to a motion to quash in a
criminal case.4 ' Petitions ought to be freely amendable in the light
of the proof with the safeguard that the boy or girl be given plenty
of time to rebut evidence developed at the trial but not alleged in the
petition. 2 Sometimes the courts are overly legalistic. An Indiana
case was reversed because the petition alleged the setting of a fire
at a certain time and place, while the boy confessed to setting an37 State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W.2d 199 (1946).
38. See argument developed in a Note, Misapplication of the Parcns
PatraePower, 29 Ind. L. J. 475 (1954).

39. E.g., Standard Juvenile Court Act (1941) § 11.
40. "It is not necessary that the petition be drawn by one learned in

the law. But it should show m plain and clear language the facts or situation
which reveal dependency, neglect or delinquency. An intelligent layman
should be able to do that" State m the interest of Graham, 110 Utah 159. 168.
170 P.2d 172, 177 (1946). See also State v. Johnson, 131 La. 8, 58 So. 1015
(1912), State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147, 181 S.W.2d 517 (1944) (criminal
pleading rules do not apply in juvenile court). Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69,

16 N.W.2d 390 (1944) (allegation m the words of the juvenile court statute
without-more detail is sufficient).
The prayer of the petition does not control the disposition of the case.
Ex parte Norris, 268 P.2d 303 (Okla. Crm. 1954).
41. Note the large number of criminal acts alleged to make the "delinquency" m Hewlitt v. Probate Court, 66 Idaho 690, 168 P2d 77 (1946). See
also In re Hartman, 93 CaL App. 2d 801, 210 P.2d 53 (1949).
-42. The petition m In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So.2d 466 (1954).
merely stated that the child was in need of the protection of the court. Objection on appeal was dismissed "[S]ince evidence was adduced at that trial
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other fire in another place. 43 In Cantu.v. State," to take another
example, the allegations stated that Cantu had (1) seduced a
sixteen year old girl under a promise of marriage, (2) had threatened her with serious bodily harm if she did not sign a suicide note,
and (3) had kept his father's car overnight without his father's
permission. Allegations (2) and (3) were held too vague and
indefinite to charge violation of any penal statute or to constitute
Jose Cantu, Jr., a "delinquent child." The proof, which indicated
that sexual relations had taken place lacked detail as to the circumstances and these failed to bear out the particulars of the first allegation. However, the facts actually shown clearly pointed to a need for
treatment. The petition should have been amended to reflect the
pattern of sexual behavior and violence revealed at the trial. Little
is gained by requiring a new petition to be filed except delay in the
treatment process. One of the reasons the accusation is so important
in a criminal case is that a certain punishment is related to a certain crime, therefore it becomes vital that A has been alleged and
proved rather than B. In a juvenile case, once a justification for
action is shown, the treatment is to be individualized without regard to the delinquent act. Whether a child steals a tire or burglarizes a house should make little difference. His treatment should depend upon his needs.
Before a hearing on the petition, the child's parents or guardian
are entitled to notice so they may be able to represent his interests
and to cooperate with the process of treatment. Generally the requirement of notification is thought so important that the juvenile
court does not have the power to act unless notice has been given,'1
without any objection, such evidence effected an enlargement of the pleadings
and supplied any deficiencies therein." Id. at 579, 73 So.2d at 468. The opinion

asserts that no claim of surprise was made nor was the truthfulness of the
evidence challenged. Full amendment was also supported by the opinion il

Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944). The court felt that a
contrary view would defeat the purpose of the juvenile court law.
43. In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192 (1951). See also

In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952), in which a boy was

charged with "immoral conduct" and the judge told the boy's father that lie

was going to send the youngster to "Boys' School and straighten him up."
44. 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Robinson v. State, 204

S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), is another Texas case which sets technical

pleading requirements for a delinquency petition. See also Ex parlc Guisti,

51 Nev. 105, 269 Pac. 600 (1928).
In re Fisher, 184 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), reverses a uvenile

court which heard evidence of other misdeeds than the one alleged in the
petition. If plenty of opportunity is given to answer, it would seem proper
to hear all the evidence and amend the petition rather than to reverse as in a

criminal case.
45. E.g., People v. Harris, 343 Ill. App. 462, 99 N.E.2d 390 (1951)
State v. Andersen, 159 Neb. 601, 68 N.W.2d 146 (1955), In re Roth, 158
Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954), Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
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or the requirement has been waived through
actual appearance by
6
parent or guardian or in some other way.'
TnE HEAR.ING IN THE JUVENILE CoURT

Under most juvenile statutes, a youngster is not entitled to trial
by jury even if the petition alleges acts which would be criminal
if done by an adlt.47 The courts have uniformly held that the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury in a criminal case have no
application to juvenile proceedings. A jury trial would inevitably
bring a good deal more formality to the juvenile court without
giving a youngster a demonstrably better fact-finding process than
trial before a judge. The jury provides the accused with a weapon
against political crimes repressive of civil liberties, a weapon juveniles do not generally need. Furthermore, the jury affords the
accused some protection against punishment which is greater than
the community, speaking through the jury, thinks warranted in a
given case. The juvenile court is not concerned with punishment
as such, but, first, with establishing that a basis exists for the
use of state power to care for a child, and, then, prescribing a treatment cut to the special needs of the individual. The judge and his
staff would be better able to make tlus determination than an inexperienced and -unskilled jury. If the practice of the court does not
stray from the theory, children have lost no important right when
judges find the facts.
A child is, of course, entitled to an unbiased judge if we understand that the disqualification for bias operates only to excuse judges
having a personal dislike of the youngster or a personal interest in
the outcome. The judge can be prejudiced in favor of law enforcement or of the juvenile court system without destroying his usefulness. The bar will will have to become accustomed to the role of the
juvenile court judge which requires him to take a much more active
part in the courtroom proceedings than judges ordinarily do.' 8 The
judge ought to be motivated by a deep interest in children which
46. In re Etherington, 35 Cal. 2d 863 221 P.2d 942 (1950), People v.
Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 112 N.E.2d 697 ( 1953), In re Tillotson 225 La. 573,
73 So.2d 466 (1954) , Ex parte Norris, 268 P2d 302 (Okla. Crim. 1954).

47. The cases are collected in 67 A.L.P_ 1082 (1930). In some states a
jury trial may be demanded in juvenile court, for example in Oklahoma. Ex
parte Iollowell, 84 Okla. Crim. 355, 182 P.2d 771 (1947).
48. Even so, one may doubt whether a juvenile court judge ought to
have authority to make personal investigations of his own to supplement the
evidence at the trial. Kessler v. Williston, 117 Ind. App. 690 75 N.E.2d 676
(1947). Nor is it the best practice for a trial judge to read a prepared typewritten statement of Is decision immediately after the conclusion of the testimony. In re Church, 204 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App. 1947).
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will guide his actions. Juvenile court judges ought to have some
specialized skill and therefore rules which permit an automatic
change of judge in juvenile cases are very unfortunate if the effect
is to disqualify the juvenile court judges and to take the case before
49
a magistrate without experience in juvenile matters.
A juvenile is not entitled to a public trial, open to the gaze of the
community and the press.50 An open trial would operate as a check
on arbitrary action by the court, but the advantage would be purchased at the expense of punishing the juvenile by publicity The
goals of protecting a young person from the misconduct of his youth,
and of informing the community how its courts operate in every
case, cannot be pursued simultaneously
The ideal of informality in the juvenile court has led some courts
to question witnesses without administering an oath.5 ' Surely a
child is entitled to the protection of the laws against perjury and
(even in these secular days) to the added incentive for truth-telling
on the part of the few who respect the oath itself. Perhaps an exception might be made in the case of questioning young children.
There the fear which formalism can breed may outweigh the benefit
52
of testimony under oath.

An authoritative source has said "A fair hearing does not mean
that the child, in particular, or that both parents need to be present
while all the evidence is being presented. The court may exclude
the child (but not his counsel) from the hearing at any time that
it thinks proper, and should do so, especially when the evidence is
considered not fit for him to hear or when it may damage his confidence in his parents."53 We can admit that the knowledge of some
49. See State ex rel. Jones v. Geckler, 214 Ind. 574, 16 N.E.2d 875
(1938). This case is doubly unfortunate because in Indiana a special judge
appointed from the bar for one case only will frequently preside at the trial
when the regular judge is challenged.
50. State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951).
51. The problem is discussed in 43 A.L.A. 2d 1128, 1145 (1955). In re
Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954) reversed a juvenile court in a
non-delinquency case in part for failing to swear the witnesses.
52. See State v. Chrstiansen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951)
53. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's
Bureau, Standards for Specialized Courts 58 (1954). Cinque v. Boyd, 99
Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923), upholds the constitutionality of a hearing
without confrontation. In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952)
reversed an adjudication made without (1) notice, (2) the presence of the
child, (3) confrontation, (4) opportunity for cross-examination, or (5)
a chance to meet the information contained in an ex parte report.
State v. Ferrell, 83 S.E.2d 648 (WVa. Sup. Ct. of App. 1954), reversed
a summary commitment to the state school for girls upon an admission of
sexual relations with a soldier made during a hearing 'in which the girl was
a witness. No petition was filed nor any hearing held. State v. Reister, 80
NW.2d 114 (N.D. 1956), suggests a private hearing of witness in the judge's
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testimony may make the child's treatment more difficult. A court
hearing is probably an enormous emotionaf disturbance to a child.
Yet how can he make a truly effective reply to evidence unless he
knows .what it is and who said it. The presence of an attorney (and
there may be none) is not a sufficient check. The child must know
about all the adverse evidence and the sources. Furthermore,
a record ought to be kept in every case, either in the form of stenographic notes or of a mechanical recording, so the opportunity for
an effective appeal can be provided.
A rule which requires alleged delinquents to be told that they
need not testify at the hearing would be most unfortunate. 4 The
hearing ought to be a part of the treatment process, a function which
it certanly cannot perform if the child is told that he need not
talk to the judge or to anyone else about the situation m which
he finds himself. If the juvenile proceeding is truly protective and
non-accusatory in character, there can be little need for a privilege
against testifying similar to the privilege against self-incrimination.
The latter privilege is tied to the accusatorial scheme of the criminal
law. It is an expression of the dignity of the accused although the
collective power of the state is ranged against him. Further, perchambers might be a "serious irregularity," but in the North Dakota case
the interview had taken place after the decision had been made.
Many statements saying that the essentials of a fair hearing must be observed in a juvenile case are found in the cases. E.g.,
The judge of any court, and especially a judge of a juvenile court, should
therefore, be willing at all times, not only to respect, but to maintain and
preserve, the legal and natural rights of men and children alike. Respondent,
as this record discloses, either has no regard for, or is uninformed in respect to, the rules that the experience of past generations has evolved
for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of all Like most laymen, but
seemingly without their good judgment, respondent seems to regard
these rules as mere technicalities to be brushed aside as obstructions in
the pathway of what is usually termed 'common-sense justice.' He seems
to be a willing convert to the theory that he is better, if not wiser, than
both law and rules of procedure, and that he may thus disregard either
or both at pleasure. While juvenile courts cannot, and are not expected
to, be conducted as criminal or other courts usually are, the judge should
still not wholly disregard all wholesome rules in an attempt to establish
guilt which he suspects, or, worse yet, merely imagines. Most of the
rules of evidence and procedure were established, and their observance
is necessary, to curb the propensities of the mquisitor, and it would, no
doubt, better- subserve the best interests of all if the most important of
these rules were observed by respondent in his investigations. The
fact that the American system of government is controlled and directed
by laws, not men, cannot be too often nor too strongly impressed upon
those who administer any branch or part of the government. Where a
proper spirit and good judgment are followed as a guide, oppression can
and will be avoided.
Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 487, 88 Pac. 609, 615 (1907).
54. A warning concerning self-mcrimnation is generally not necessary.
Iln re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947), People v. Lewis,
260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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haps its greatest usefulness lies in making itdifficult to convict a
man for his opinions or politics, matters not often the basis for a
delinquency petition. No overriding reason can be seen why a child
should not be compelled to testify although the element of compulsion would itself impair close relations between the court and
the youngster.", One matter should be made clear the propriety of
freely receiving a child's testimony in a delinquency case assumes
that he may not be criminally prosecuted for offenses revealed by his
statements. If the youth can be turned over to the criminal courts
for punishment, or if he can be punished after his treatment by the
juvenile authorities, his privilege against self-incrimination must
be carefully guarded. 50 The common statutory provisions forbidding
the use of a juvenile's testimony in another proceeding is not a
sufficient guarantee. The youngster must be protected against prosecution for any offense revealed by his testimony before it is fair to
strip him of the right given the worst criminals. If he has need of
the privilege against self-incrimination, the judge must decide the
difficult but little discussed problem of how the privilege can be
waived. Surely a fourteen year old without counsel ought to be
incapable of waiver.
EVIDENCE IN TIlE JUVENILE COURT

Some cases have discussed the question whether the criminal
law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" properly describes the rule of
proof required in a delinquency case, or whether a simple "preponderance" of evidence will suffice.5 It is difficult to guess exactly
55.

The alleged delinquent was called and examined against a claim of

privilege m In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), In re Mont, 175
Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954). Cases are collected in 43 A.L.R. 2d 1128,

1133-38 (1955).
56. In re Taahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 805 (1920) (juvenile court
law held not to justify commitment to juvenile detention home solely because
minor refused to answer incriminating questions).
57 In Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 342, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447
(1946) the Court said, "Guilt should be proven by evidence which leaves
no reasonable doubt." For a time it seemed that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required under the Children's Court Act of New York. In re
Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931), cf. People v. Fitzgerald.
244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927). The preponderance rule was established
by People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932). See also Garner v.
Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939) and the cases collected in 43 A.L.R.
2d 1128, 1138-41 (1955).
It should be clear that direct testimony should be given greater weight
than hearsay as to the same matters. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
241 P.2d 631 (1952). The civil rule that in the absence of proof to the contrary the law of a sister state is presumed to be the same as that of the foruni
has been applied in a juvenile case. See State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151,
275 S.W.2d 463 (1955).
Carmean v. People, 110 Colo. 399, 134 P.2d 1056 (1943), is an example
of a reversal for failure to make sufficient proof.

19571

JUVENILE OFFENDER

what effect such words have on the mind of a judge. However, on
the assumption that the problem is a real one, the criminal law test
should be confined to criminal prosecutions. "Beyond a reasonable
doubt" is a device to prevent punishment m the wrong cases. In a
juvenile case the aim is not punishment but rehabilitation; the risk
of failing to act may be greater than the risk of acting too quickly.
This is not to say that evidence is not needed, but merely that the
consequences of error are not quite so serious in a juvenile case
and therefore we need not be quite so cautious.
In the rush to classify a delinquency case as a civil case and
hence not subject to the evidence rules of the criminal court, some
troublesome evidence problems have been brushed aside. It may be
reasonable to make an adjudication of delinquency on the basis
of a confession alone,5 but risky business to do the same on an
uncorroborated account of seduction. Even when concerning a
child, stories of sexual activity are easier to tell than to refute. The
tale of a collaborator at wrongdoing would seem as untrustworthy
mna juvenile as m a criminal case. -9
The willingness of juvenile court judges to receive hearsay
evidence has been the source of a great deal of lawyers' criticism.
That the criticism is not without persuasive force can be seen by
considering an example. In the now famous Holtes case,00 the
juvenile court judge permitted a detective to testify that Holmes
had participated mna church robbery according to the signed confession of another young man. The court demanded to see neither
the confession nor the confessor. Although at a subsequent hearing
the person who had made the confession repudiated it, Holmes was
adjudicated a delinquent. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
brushed aside objections to these proceedings with, "[T]he hearing in the Juvenile Court may, in order to accomplish the purposes
for which juvenile court legislation is designed, avoid many of the
"61
legalistic features of the rules of evidence.
Concerning the repudiation of the confession the court said,
"[T]he judge was not obliged to believe his retraction. "0 2- The
58. In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So.2d 466 (1954), People v. Lewis,
260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), Ballard v. State, 192 SAV.2d 329 (Tx.
Civ. App. 1946).
59. People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927). In State
v. David, 226 La. 268, 76 So.2d 1 (1954), a trial judge's failure in a criminal
case to caution the jury on the use of an accomplice's testimony was not
error because the alleged accomplice, a young girl, could not be punished of

crime for her participation. She could only be adjudicated a juvenile de-

linquent.
60. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
61. Id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.
62. Ibid.
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court did add that nothing in the record indicated that the lower
court judge acted on the basis of Holmes' participation in the church
robbery, although Judge Mussmano, in a strident dissent, insisted
to the contrary However, other technical grounds for the disposition of the case apparently were present.
Upon the assumption that the trial court in Holmes was moved
to a finding of delinquency by the detective's statement, most
lawyers will condemn the judge's action. What is the proper basis
of the condemnation? It would seem clear that, in a juvenile case
tried by a judge alone (as most of them are), the mere reception
of hearsay would not vitiate a finding if there were, besides that,
sufficient evidence in the recordY3 Is an adjudication necessarily improper because it is based only on hearsay ? Suppose a disinterested
eye witness to an act of deliquency dictates and signs an affidavit
immediately thereafter. If that witness becomes unavailable through
death, might not a juvenile court adjudicate the status of the child
involved though the court relied solely on the document ? Some
hearsay is persuasive, and men of prudence ordinarily rely upon it
in their most important concerns. Even in jury trials the rule
against hearsay is riddled with exceptions. Should not the real
questions be whether the evidence is probative and whether we can
get better information, rather than whether the offer of proof is
hearsay or not?64 The Holmes case (upon the assumption made
above) is shocking because the statement is so untrustworthy and
direct examination of the confessor himself so easily done.
In a well known dictum, the New York Court of Appeals addressed itself to the question of a fair trial in the juvenile court and
said, "The customary rules of evidence shown by long experience
as essential to getting at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil
trials must be adhered to.
Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood feelings, the hopes and fears
of social workers, are all sources of error and have no more place
in Children's Courts than in any other court." 5 The statement commands general agreement but surely goes awry in lumping "hearsay" with "bias," "gossip" and "prejudice." Some unsworn out-of63. In re Holmes, supra note 62, In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103
A.2d 460 (1954) , In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944). But see Garner v. Wood.
188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939) (case tried before a jury) , In re Ross, 45
Wash. 2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954) (admitting hearsay was reversible error
where hearsay was clearly the sole basis for a portion of the court's findings).

64. If the hearsay is completely contradicted by non-hearsay evidence

at the hearing, is an adjudication of delinquency improper? Compare In re
Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241' P.2d 631 (1952), with State v. Reister,

80 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1956).

65. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932)
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court statements are utterly convincing and we would be foolish
not to act on the basis of them. The problem is one of discriminating
between those statements which are dangerous to use and those
which are not. The great truth of the New York court's dictum
lies in the insistence that the juvenile practice may not fall below
the standards employed in the civil courts generally. But should
those courts, encouraged by the American Law Institute Model
Code of Evidence,6 6 move i the direction of the more liberal use
of hearsay, it is proper for the juvenile courts to follow.
A juvenile, brought before a court with proper facilities, will
be the subject of a social casework investigation. Ideally, the caseworker will seek to learn all that is humanly possible about the
child, hIs motivation, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged
delinquency If the case study is made before an adjudication of delinquency, there is a great temptation to use the case report in the
proceedings determining that issue. The caseworker is likely to
know more about the child and Ins needs than anyone else. It is
much easier to hear the caseworker only than to arrange for the
appearance and examination of a number of witnesses particularly
if (as is true in the overwhelming number of cases) the facts are
not in dispute.
In In re Mantell,67 the petition alleged that Mantell, a fifteen
year old, had been associating with vicious and immoral people and
had been guilty of immoral conduct. Mr. Lawrence Krell, apparently a social worker, made a detailed unsworn statement with regard to the defendant's conduct. It is a fair guess that the trial
court, in permitting the use of this hearsay, relied upon a portion
of the Nebraska Juvenile Court Act. "
[T] he court shall proceed
to hear and dispose of the case in a summary manner."
Mantell squarely presents the issue whether we can use the
casework report as a short cut in a delinquency proceeding. What
are the dangers to the child in such a report? He and those who
stand with him are unable to cross-examine the witnesses whose
evidence is summarized. People may be much more willing to
whisper a damaging false statement to a caseworker than to testify
in front of the child. The caseworker himself may have a serious
prejudice against the youngster and his family, or, perhaps more
importantly, the case investigation may have been badly bungled
through ineptitude rather than viciousness. There is a special diffi66. ALI Model Code of Evidence, Morgan, Foreword 36-51 and
C. Vi. (1942).
67. 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954). See also In re Godden, 158
Neb. 246, 63 N.Ar2d 151 (1954).
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culty attached to the exclusive use of case report evidence in Mantell
because of the vagueness of the charges. Testimony respecting the
morality of companions and conduct must contain a large measure of
subjectivity Where such reports, without more evidence, have
been the basis of the adjudication of delinquency, the trial courts
have been reversed on appeal."" Yet we pay a price for our doubts
about social investigation as evidence. A solid job of inquiry can
gain much understanding relevant to a child's need for help which
will not readily crystallize into testimony about what a child had
actually done. The necessity of producing all the witnesses in court
uses their time, gives greater publicity to the child's troubles, and
introduces a formal element in the adjudication which makes it more
difficult to begin the healthy process of rehabilitation inside the
courtroom. On the balance the price ought to be paid. The danger
of mistake or prejudice in this important matter is too great. But
we should be aware that we do not save our children from hopeless
tyranny by insisting on the right to cross-examination.
In a great many places the point has been made as a point of
high principle that while juvenile courts should not use the casework report in adjudicating delinquency, it may be used in determining the disposition of the child once delinquency has been established. 9 The distinction does not seem an easy one to defend except
by the argument that an adjudication of delinquency will usually
turn on a narrow question of fact, s.e.,
did the youngster perform
the act of delinquency and, therefore, it will be feasible to bring
68. Ford v.State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952) , In re
Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954). See the cases collected in 43
A.L.R. 2d 1128, 1141-43 (1955).
In California, casework reports have been used as the sole basis for
adjudication in dependency and neglect cases. In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App.
2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (1948), In re Jones, 34 Cal. App. 2d 77, 93 P.2d 185
(1939). But see In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (1926), Itsrc
Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 141 P.2d 631 (1952).
State v. Campbell, 177 La. 559, 148 So. 708 (1933), and State in the
Interest of McDonald, 207 La. 117, 20 So.2d 556 (1944), are cases arising
under a Louisiana statute which makes the testimony of a probation officer
admissible as to the result of his investigation.
The goal of informality may be pursued with such snglemindedness that
the child and the parents not know what is going on. Kahm v. People,
83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928) (mother assumed that some sort of "preliminary examnation or conversation" was taking place). See also In re
Green, 123 Ind.App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952) , Petition of O'Leary, 325 Mass.
179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950) , State ex rel. Palagi v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262
Pac. 168 (1927), In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
69. United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Children's Bureau, Standards for Specialized Courts 53 (1954). In New
York an informal survey of judges revealed that a little over half of the
judges responding to a questionnaire consulted background reports before
the hearing. Note, Correct Use of Background Reports in Juvenile Deliiquencv Cases, 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 67 (1953).
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in the few witnesses necessary while the question of disposition
may turn one a great range of factors, many of which are deeply
imbedded m subjective judgment. Yet m either case, use of a
report puts a great reliance on the professional judgment and
integrity of the caseworker in a matter of highest importance to the
child. We must emphasize that the disposition can be as vital to the
child as the adjudication of delinquency. The disposition can range
from an admonition followed by a reunion with parents, to commitment m an institution not greatly different from a prison. Surely
the information on wuch such a decision is taken ought to be carefully gathered and dispassionately evaluated. The process of disposition in the juvenile court must meet a standard of fairness, and
that standard requires as a minimum that casework reports be
made available to the child's lawyer upon request. It will be objected
that revealing all of a report may be shocking to a child or his parents and may make the treatment process more difficult. The social
worker will fear the disappearance of his sources of information because witnesses, reluctant to testify in court or to become embroiled
in controversy with a neighbor, will speak less freely. It will be
urged that the opportunity to meet the findings of casework reports is impractical and would open too many collateral issues. Yet
how can we insure fairness in disposition without some way of
testing the basis for decision, and how can we test without knowing
what ought to be tested? Can we be content by trusting the professional discipline of the social worker alone?
In Holes, a juvenile judge's refusal to disclose a probation
officer's report was upheld in reliance upon the United States
Supreme Court in Williams v. New York. 0 There the Court approved, over due process objections, the use of presentence casework reports in the imposition of a death sentence. But the Court
was careful to point out that "the accuracy of the statements made
by the judge
was not challenged by appellant or us counsel nor
was the judge asked to disregard any of them or to afford appellant
a chance to refute or discredit any of them by cross-enxammation or
otherwise."' ' We may hope that if the accuracy of the report had
70. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). An inspection of prehearing investigation reports was also denied to the boy's counsel in In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150.
103 A.2d 460 (1954). It may be that the receipt of hearsay is not a ground
for reversal especially if the finding of delinquency is supported by other
competent evidence but surely the child's lawyer must be permitted to know
what the judge has had presented to him before an adjudication is made.
71. 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949). The refusal to permit a contesting mother
to inspect a welfare agency report used in an adoption proceeding has been
held a demal of a fair trial. Attlasson v. Usrey, 224 Ind. 155, 65 N.rF2d 488

(1946).
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been challenged the Court would have given tie defendant ani
opportunity to meet the derogatory information.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

There has been a great deal of recent intercst in whether a
juvenile must be advised of a right to counsel and be furnished
counsel by the state if he is unable to provide one. In the Poff case, T '
District judge Curran of the District of Columbia held that a
child's right to counsel was grounded in due process. The judge
agreed that juvenile proceedings were aimed at providing the care
and guidance normally furnished by natural parents. Yet the
juvenile court act was intended to enlarge rather than to diminish
the protection of a youngster. The holding was influenced by the fact
that the alleged act of delinquency was a crime and that legal
protections were not to be torn away simply by changing the name
of a proceeding. The Judge wrote, "I hold only that where the
child commits an act, which act if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime, then due process in the Juvenile Court requires
that the child be advised that he is entitled to the effective assistance
of counsel, and this is so even though the Juvenile Court in making
dispositions of delinquent children, is not a criminal court.""
Shioutaken v. District of Columba,1 4 a Court of Appeals case
reaching the same result as Poff, rests on an interpretation of the
juvenile court act applicable to the District rather than on due
process. The court supported its reading of the statute in several
ways. The legislative history reflected a congressional understanding
that alleged delinquents would be represented by counsel. The
statute provided for a "hearing" which "requires the effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile court quite as much as it does in a
criminal court."' 5 The child, under the District's Juvenile Court
Act, has a right to ask for a trial by jury, a request which cannot be
made wisely without the assistance of a lawyer The procedural
rights of an alleged delinquent under the juvenile court rules cannot
72. 135 F Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955)
73. Id. at 227
74. 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

75. Id. at 669.
See also In re Poulin, 129 A.2d 672 (N.H. 1957) which holds that under

a statute authorizing the presence of persons "necessary in the interest of
justice" it was reversible error to deny a motion that counsel appear at the
hearing in juvenile court. The Court said at p. 673, "a concomitant of ain
opportunity to be heard in support of or in defense of a claim is the right
to the assistance of counsel." Further, "The worthwhile objectives of the
juvenile courts can be accomplished without prohibitinj the child or the
parent from obtaining the assistance of counsel."
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be protected adequately without legal help, to say nothing of the
-legal problems connected with an appeal. Finally, the statute was
-considered, after the fashion of McNabb, in the light of tile court's
"concern for the fair administration of justice.""
Shwutaken, just as Poff, rests, in part, on the conviction that
impo-tant rights cannot be brushed aside merely by a change of
label. A child, charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, may not be deprived of his liberty without an
adjudication based on evidence adduced in a fair hearing. Such an
approach raises two questions. Is a child entitled to counsel if the
court does not deprive him of liberty in the sense of committing him
to an institution, but merely places him on probation? Does he have
the same right if the alleged delinquency is conduct short of criminality, e.g., "associating with immoral persons" or "incorrigibility"
and "acting beyond the control of hIs parents ?"
Both questions, in the author's view, require an affirmative
answer. As to the first, it is impossible to foretell whether commitment will result from the trial, and the need for counsel exists, if
it exists at all, from the moment the petition is filed. In any event,
"treatment," though short of detention, is performed under the
compulsion of the state. The need for any intervention by the
government into the life of a child ought to be clearly demonstrated
in a fair proceeding wherein the legal rights of the child are protected. In spite of the theory to the contrary, an adjudication of delinquency, in itself, is harmful and should not be capriciously
imposed.7"
The same considerations support an affirmative answer to the
second question. Indeed, the need for legal assistance may even be
greater in those cases in which the allegations of the petition are
vague. Especially careful attention should be given, from the
child's point of view, to the proof which will be offered in support
of such petitions.
Those judges who have denied a juvenile the right to counsel
have relied on the purpose and aim of a juvenile court. 8 The objec76. Id. at 670. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
77. The judgment against a youth that he is delinquent is a serious reflection upon Ins character and habits. The stain against him is not removed
merely because the statute says no judgment m this particular proceeding

shall be deemed a conviction for crime or so considered. The stigma
of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his self-respect. It

may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly head to

destroy his opportunity for advancement and blast his ambition to build
up a character and reputation entitling um to the esteem and respect of
his fellow men.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946).
78. People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).
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tive is rehabilitation, not punishment. The proceedings do not
determine guilt or innocence, but rather promote the welfare of
the child by strengthening the family or by removing the child
from the custody of his parents should that be necessary. Drawing
an analogy from the fact that a jury is not required in delinquency
proceedings, these judges have argued that neither statutory construction nor the Constitution demand that a child be given a
lawyer.
In addition to this sort of argument, some experts in the juvenile
field doubt whether lawyers have much to contribute. 9 It is probably true that few members of the bar operate easily in a nonadversary kind of proceeding, particularly in juvenile cases which
seem much like ordinary criminal trials. Professor Kahn reports
a case situation in which a lawyer, by careful questioning, succeeded
in proving that his client had not forced a complaining witness
to submit to intercourse, an act which the petition had charged.80
The client, however, had had voluntary sexual relations with the
fourteen year old complainant. His act was an act of delinquency
in either event. Presumably, the client would not have been punished in proportion to the seriousness of the deed, but would be
given treatment to improve his character. The sharp cross-examination of a disturbed girl provided the basis for the lawyer's plea for
"lemency"-a concept appropriate to the criminal law but hardly
a useful idea in the juvenile court. My own reading of a large
number of juvenile court records makes plain the unhappy role that
many lawyers play in juvenile cases. Often the attorneys are merely
uninformed pettifoggers.
That lawyers are not ordinarily trained to be helpful does not
argue against assigning them a role in delinquency cases, but rather
in favor of giving lawyers an understanding of the aims and methods
of the juvenile courts. The failure of the bar is a great responsibility
of the law schools and bar associations.
With adequate understanding of the task, lawyers can contribute a great deal. Every child faced with an adjudication of delinquency should have access to legal help.81 A lawyer's skill in
79. Judge Alexander, of the Toledo Juvenile Court has said, "We seldom
see a lawyer in juvenile court--and when we do, we have to tell him what
to do and how to do it." See Virtue, Survey of Metropolitan Courts Detroit
Area 116 (1950).
80. Kahn, A Court for Children 100-01 (1953).
81. Speaking of an adjudication that a child is a "wayward minor,"
a status similar to delinquency, Professor Tappan has written, "[T]here must
be an opportunity for an attorney representing the defendant to bring into the
open the source and nature of the evidence so that where the source of the
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developing the facts in detail can, if done without harsh grilling of
young witnesses, result in a fuller understanding of a total situation.
In the Shioutaken case, Judge Bazelon reminded us that juveniles
have legal rights and the exercise of them requires informed
judgment8 21 Counsel is important for another reason. Juvenile
proceedings are conducted behind closed doors. Only the judge, the
child, the witnesses, the parents, the social workers, and an occasional interested person (by permission of the judge) are present.
This may seem like a large group, but one factor is lacking--competent impartial observation not dependent on the judge. It would
not be a hasty guess to suppose that a judge's performance (and
that of ins staff) will be much more alert and careful under the
gaze of a lawyer than otherwise. The greatest value of the attorney
may be his very presence, rather than his ability to give affirmative
help.
If a juvenile ought to have counsel, at what stage should the
right commence? The Shwutaken opinion dearly limited its holding
to cases in which petitions have been filed.8s Although impressive
criticism has been made of the informal handling of cases without
bringing them to court, it is probably impractical to require counsel
before the petition is filed.
A recent California case, People v. Dotsen,8 ' presents a difficult
question. A youngster (with others) allegedly ransacked a house,
but was interrupted by the return of the owner. The intruders
bound and gagged the owner in such a way as to cause his death
by suffocation. The boy was arraigned upon an indictment in criminal court, but when it was learned he was a minor of eighteen years,
proceedings were suspended, and he was taken to juvenile court.
After a hearing, the judge decided that, m the light of the indicttestimony is of inferior credibility little weight will be attached to it." Tappan,
Delinquent Girls in Court 108 (1947). He would provide counsel through
the Legal Aid Society. Id. at 192.
The need for legal assistance is certainly not satisfied by the appointment
as counsel for the child the lawyer of a hostile mother, the moving spirit
behind conunmitent proceedings. In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Munc. Ct. App.
D.C. 1953). A juvenile court's refusal to permit parents' lawyers "active
participation" in the juvenile court proceedings has been held a denial of due
process in a dependency and neglect case. Arizona State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296 P.2d 298 (Ariz. 1956).
82. Compare the following from an undated mimeographed statement
prepared by the Wayne County Juvenile Court, Detroit, Micugan, cited in Virtue, Survey of Metropolitan Courts Detroit Area 115 (1950) "The child need
not employ defense counsel, as there are no legal pitfalls to guard against
or judical technicalities or devices to employ." According to Mrs. Virtue,
defense counsel are rarely used in the Wayne County Juvenile Court.
83. "We do not hold that counsel is essential in the preliminary stages
before a petition is filed." 236 F.2d 666, 670 n. 25 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
84. 299 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1956).
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ment, "the report of the Probation Officer, the prior record of the
minor, the minor's character, the type of his offense, his actual age,
and other relevant factors"' 5 the boy was not a "fit subject" for
consideration under the juvenile court law, and remanded the youth
to the criminal court. The boy had no lawyer in the juvenile court,
nor apparently had he been offered one. The Supreme Court of
California held that no constitutional right had been violated by
the failure to provide counsel in this proceeding, judged either by
the standards applicable to children's tribunals or according to the
rules applicable to the regular criminal courts. The court did not see
the juvenile court determination as a stage in the criminal proceedings, but rather emphasized the judge's great discretion in deciding whether a child is a "fit subject" for consideration in the
juvenile court.
What could a lawyer have done for Dotsen? He could have
developed facts for the court. He could have seen to it that those
considerations upon which the judge relied were probable truths.
He could have tried to persuade the court. These services could be
very useful. Although the indictment charged murder under the
felony-murder doctrine, the youth alleged that he made no effort
to have the matter retained in juvenile court. He thought he had a
defense to the murder charge because he intended no harm to the
deceased. A lawyer could have enlightened the boy on the fine
points of the felony-murder doctrine and thus encouraged efforts to
remain in juvenile court. Yet it is hard to find a legal basis for
insisting upon the right to counsel here. No adjudication of delinquency was made, no treatment prescribed. The action of the
court was simply to let the criminal law take its course. A full
criminal trial with all the protections will follow The chldren's
court plays a role in this instance not unlike that of a prosecutor in
the exercise of his discretion. It makes a decision that a given case
should go forward to trial. Although that decision is made after a
hearing, the whole procedure seems too close to the ordinary
processes of bringing an accusation to require that the youngster
be represented by counsel at that stage.
In insisting that a juvenile has a right to counsel, we create a
serious problem of making it a real right. While a parent may be
able to waive counsel, it would seem clear that a youth may not do
so on his own behalf.8 6 If a child's parents are hostile or absent, the
85. Id. at 876.
86. See the discussion m In re Poff, 135 F Supp. 224, 227-28 (D.D.C.
1955). In State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951), the court
reached the doubtful conclusion that a fourteen year old's statement, "Judge,
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alleged offender must have a guardian ad [item appointed, and the
guardian, as well, may waive the right to a lawyer. This is not the
place to discuss the sources from which legal assistance may be
had. A system of assigned counsel (with adequate compensation)87
legal aid provided by the organized bar, or a kind of public defender
for juveniles, are all possible methods of achieving the goal.
FAIRNESS IN THE TREATMENT

PROCESS

Fair treatment of a child should not end with an adjudication of
delinquency. If he is placed on probation or parole, the terms of the
conditional release should be made reasonably clear. There is danger
in the approach of an Oklahoma court. "[T]his court will take
judicial notice of the fact that one of the conditions . . . [of her

parole] was that the petitioner would shun evil associates and refrain
from law violations."8 ' What a court will assume to be a condition
of release may not be so clear to the youngster.
Revocation of parole after an ex parte hearing without notice to
the child has been permitted because the statutes do not provide for
notice to the juvenile on a parole violation." Certainly statutes ought
to provide for notice and hearing. To be put back into an institution
with all the attendant unpleasantness is a serious matter which ought
to occur only for clearly demonstrated reasons. Probation officers
9°
are, like all men, capable of arbitrary action. In Ex parte Karns,
a field counselor "gave petitioner the option to go back to her husband in Defiance [Ohio] or be taken back to School, even though
the house the husband had selected was not fit for human habitadon't want no lawyers or anyone representing me" operated as a waiver
because she had been married a few moments before and therefore she had
"sufficient judgment and knew what she was doing." The outcome of the
case can be supported because the girl's mother was present and apparently
concurred in all that was done.
87. In Iowa the juvenile court's power to appoint counsel to represent
a juvenile gives rise to an obligation on the part of the county to pay a
reasonable fee. Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W.
223 (1938).
88. Ex parte Woodworth, 92 Okla. Crim. 235, 238, 222 P.2d 528, 530
(1950).
is not necessary that notice be served upon the parents, or
89. "[lt
that a jury trial be had before entering an order, where there has been a
violation of the parole order formerly made, . . ." Ex parte Hollowell, 84
said that a hearing need not be had before a child can be taken into custody
Okla. Crim 355, 363, 182 P.2d 771, 774 (1947). The Utah Supreme Court has
but the authorities must have "good reason" for doing so. The reason can
be tested on habeas corpus with the burden of proving "lack of good reason" resting upon the child. Ex parte S. H., 1 Utah 2d 186, 264 P.2d 850
(1953). The North Dakota court has held that a hearing is necessary without
making explicit what makes it necessary. In re Rixon, 74 N.D. 80, 19 N.W.2d
863 (1945).
90. 121 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio App. 1953).
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." The counselor may have been cooperating with the hus-

band who had threatened the girl with a return to the industrial.
school if she refused to share his dilapidated home. Happily, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that the action taken was beyond the
counselor's authority.
Denying a child the protections of the criminally accused has an
important corollary in respect to treatment. The juvenile does not
have the rights he would have in a criminal case, it is said, because
the object of the juvenile court proceedings is to protect his welfare
under the parent-like care of the state. The act seeks to secure him
the custody and protection that he would receive at the hands of
parents. The treatment prescribed must in fact approximate this
goal or he is wrongfully deprived of his constitutional rights. Surely,
the North Dakota Supreme Court was correct in reversing .a
juvenile court judge who ordered a boy to the state training school
because of "the deterrent effect which the commitment would have
upon other juveniles."'" The goal of deterrence may properly be
pursued by the criminal law, but not by the Juvenile Court Acts
through the use of non-criminal procedure. As Judge Burke of the
North Dakota Supreme Court wrote, "considerations of expediency,
the satisfaction of public indignation, or example are contrary to the
whole spirit of the juvenile act."92
In an exceedingly interesting opinion, Judge Laws of the District of Columbia held that if a child is placed in a punitive institution
following juvenile proceedings, the writ of habeas corpus should
be available to secure his release. In White v. Reid-3 he wrotei
"Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and physical well-being, unless its facilities are in

tended for and adapted to guidance, care, education and training
rather than punishment, unless its supervision is that of a guardian,
not that of a prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commitment to
such institution is by reason of conviction of crime and cannot
91. State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W,2d 199 (1946).
92. Id. at 302, 22 N.W.2d at 201.
The trial judge in In re Curdy, 204 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App. 1947) erred in
"sentencing" a delinquent to five years instead of an indefinite
term until
majority.
One wonders whether a spirit of vengeance or perhaps the use of the
deterrence principle did not lie behind the disposition in In re Lewis, 11
N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953). Lewis, a boy of 17, killed two persons in an
auto mishap occurring because the boy had fallen asleep at the wheel. He had
driven a long way and knew he lacked adequate rest but decided to press
on in order to get back to a summer job in the Catskills. The boy was committed to the Annandale Reformatory. His act may have deserved such
punishment but there was no showing that his needs required such treatment.
93. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
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withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional
safeguards." 4 Using this test, the court held that the Attorney
General could not place a boy in the District of Columbia jail for
continued detention. At a later stage of the same controversy, 5
Judge Laws held that the Attorney General could not designate the
Federal Correctional Institution at Ashland, Kentucky, as the place
of confining a juvenile delinquent. Ashland is an institution- designed to rehabilitate youths regularly convicted in the criminal
courts. The Attorney General was ordered to designate "the National Training School for Boys or a similar institution not designed
as a. place of confinement for those convicted of crime and where
petitioner may not have contact or communication with those convicted of crime.""6
According to the first quotation, Judge Laws would release a
boy, or not, depending on the purpose and facilities of the institution.
This position was largely abandoned in the second stage of the case
and the mingling of criminals with juveniles becomes the pivotal
point. The first path, as the Judge found, is a difficult one to follow.
Nor will we want to hold the second position with unyielding
tenacity. Should there be a proper classification of convicted personnel and a civilized penal philosophy directing an institution, the
mingling of some convicted young people with delinquents will not
strike us as unfair.
94. Id. at 650.
In Underwood v. Farrell, 175 Ark. 217, 299 S.W. 5 (1927), the court
held that juvenile court proceedings were unconstitutional in the light of (a)
the evident punitive purpose of the order entered, (b) the commitment to an

institution housing young felons, (c) a definite sentence of three years. The
Farrell case was seriously undercut in Martin v. State, 213 Ark. 507, 211
S.W.2d 116 (1948). See also the action of a New York City judge in paroling
a fifteen year old because to keep him in the city prision for temporary
detention would not be "in keeping with the purpose of the entire Act. In re

Prieto, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 800 (N.Y. Dom. Rel Ct. 1944).
In In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953), a boy of seventeen was

committed to New Jersey's Annandale Reformatory after juvenile court
proceedings. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, speaking through Mr.
Justice William Brennan, refused to interfere with the judge's discretion
regarding the disposition. No constitutional argument was made.
Under an Iowa statute the commitment of a delinquent child to an
institution for neglected or dependent children was held erroneous. Murphy
v. Lacey, 237 Iowa 318, 21 N.W.2d 897 (1946).

95. White v. Reid, 126 F Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).

96. Id. at 871. See also Benton v. Reid, 231 F2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
in which a chronic sufferer from communicable tuberculosis secured his release from the hospital section of the District of Columbia jail where he had
been placed because of his unwillingness to remain in other hospitals. "(T]o
be confined in a penal institution to suffer the social stigma and bad associations resulting therefrom" without crimnal conviction would raise grave
constitutional questions. Release was ordered as a matter of statutory interpretation.
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Yet Judge Laws gives us a useful tool to employ in clear cases.
The implications of his opinions are exceedingly important. In
adopting the approach of these essays, judges could provide themselves with an effective weapon not only against a misguided
custodial officer who makes illegal confinement designations, but
also against a community in default of its obligations to the young.
If we do not provide reasonably good rehabilitation and care-taking
facilities for juveniles, the youngsters ought to go free unless we
can convict them of crime. When we do not give children in trouble
adequate institutions, we do not merely fail them, we deprive them
of constitutional rights. Parental care rather than punishment has
been offered in exchange for some constitutional safeguards. The
price must not be paid in counterfeit coin.

